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Abstract—Fully autonomous vehicles (AVs), i.e., AVs with
autonomy level 5, are expected to dominate road transportation
in the near-future and contribute trillions of dollars to the global
economy. The general public, government organizations, and
manufacturers all have significant concern regarding resiliency
and safety standards of the autonomous driving system (ADS)
of AVs . In this work, we proposed and developed (a) ‘Kayotee’
- a fault injection-based tool to systematically inject faults into
software and hardware components of the ADS to assess the
safety and reliability of AVs to faults and errors, and (b)
an ontology model to characterize errors and safety violations
impacting reliability and safety of AVs. Kayotee is capable
of characterizing fault propagation and resiliency at different
levels - (a) hardware, (b) software, (c) vehicle dynamics, and
(d) traffic resilience. We used Kayotee to study a proprietary
ADS technology built by Nvidia corporation and are currently
applying Kayotee to other open-source ADS systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The safety and reliability of autonomous vehicles (AVs) are
significant concerns among all the stakeholders. Our previous
work [1] characterized a California Department of Motor
Vehicles (DMV) dataset on reported AV road testing and
showed that as many as 36% of disengagements were caused
by computer system problems and 64% were due to machine
learning problems. AV research has traditionally focused on
improving machine learning and artificial intelligence models.
However, as these models are deployed at large scale on
computing platforms, the focus is to assess the resilience and
safety features of the compute stack driving the AVs. The
effects of faults and errors in the hardware (GPUs, CPUs and
other processing units) running the AV software stack is not
well understood. Recent work [2]–[5] exclusively focus on
the resiliency of deep neural networks (DNNs) to hardware
faults and errors without accounting for the inherent resiliency
in the software stack. [6], [7] study the safety of AVs by
injecting sensor-related permanent faults such as Gaussian
noise, occlusion, etc. into publicly available autonomous driving
system (such as CARLA [8] and Open Pilot [9]). However,
these autonomous driving system (ADS) are overly simplistic
with few sensors and are not representative of a production
ADS. Moreover, such studies have limited scope as they cannot
characterize error masking and propagation of transient, and
permanent faults in the ADS. We believe our work is the first
to study the impact of transient errors, intermittent errors and
permanent errors (with some limitations) on AV safety and
reliability.
Our work focuses on developing a fault injection tool to
assess hardware and software resilience and its implication on
the safety of ADS. We developed ‘Kayotee’ to inject faults
into software and hardware components of the ADS in a
closed-loop environment to empirically characterize resilience,
safety, and the error propagation and masking properties in
the ADS system. The fault models were chosen to emulate the
representative transient faults in the hardware and software (by
corrupting software state variables) to expose error masking
limits. The capabilities of Kayotee are (i) injection of hardware
and software faults using fault models bundled in the tool, (ii)
selection of fault sites based on software components (sensor
inputs, object perception, sensor fusion, planner and controller),
hardware components (CPU vs. GPU), and machine learning
algorithms (DNN vs. non-DNNs), (iii) creation and execution
of multiple traffic scenarios, (iv) simulation of the closed-loop
environment where parameters (such as speed, acceleration,
distance traveled by the AV and actuation command outputs
sent by the ADS) follow truncated normal distributions and
capture data from multiple modules to compare fault-free
run (i.e., golden run) values, i.e., non-injected run outputs
to injected run outputs, and (v) calculation of resilience and
safety violation parameters.
In comparison to AVFI [6], Kayotee is capable of
characterizing error propagation and masking in the ADS
using a closed-loop simulation environment and is capable
of injecting bit flips directly into GPU and CPU architectural
state. Our fault injector was tested on the Nvidia DriveWorks
platform, and we plan to extend it to Apollo [10] and
CARLA [8], [11].
To help improve the safety and reliability characteristics of
ADS, we need to answer the following research questions —
Q1: Which software modules are most vulnerable to
faults/errors among different parts of the ADS (such
as object perception, path perception, localization and
planning)?
Q2: Do errors in the ADS platform contribute statistically
more degradation in safety and resilience characteristics
than degradation because of inherent data quality and
inaccuracies in ML/AI-techniques ?
Q3: Is there any statistical relationship between
safety/resilience and input characteristics (such as
#vehicles, #people etc.) given errors?
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
01
02
4v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  1
 Ju
l 2
01
9
Figure 1: End-to-end safety and reliability evaluation of ADS using Kayotee
Q4: Is there any statistical difference in error susceptibility
among different computing platforms - CPUs and GPUs?
Due to proprietary restrictions, we only share fault injection
experiment methodology and do not provide any numerical
values/results that can identify key-characteristics of the Nvidia
driving platform or its susceptibility to faults. The views,
opinions, tools and results contained or described in this article
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of Nvidia Corporation. However, we
plan to share results with the community by implementing our
tools and techniques for open-source ADS and simulators such
as Apollo [10] and Carla [8].
II. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
An AV is any vehicle that uses an ADS technology capable
of supporting and replacing a human driver in the tasks
of controlling the main functions of steering, acceleration,
and monitoring the surrounding environment (e.g., other
vehicles/pedestrians, traffic signals, and road markings) [12].
In this work, we used a proprietary autonomous driving stack
(supporting an AI-agent running at automation level 5) and
simulation systems (see Fig 1, 1 ) developed by Nvidia
Corporation to showcase the use cases of Kayotee and its
usefulness in characterizing the safety and reliability of ADS.
Like any other ADS system, the Nvidia ADS consists of
the Nvidia AI-agent, marked as 3 in Fig 1 which further
consists of five basic modules - (a) sensors and sensor fusion
module, (b) object perception, (c) path perception, (d) maps
and localization, and (e) planning and control in addition to
several safety check mechanisms (not shown in the figure). In
addition to testing Nvidia ADS on private/public roads, Nvidia
tests the ADS using a custom Unreal Engine-based simulation
engine, DriveSim [13] (marked as 2 ). DriveSim is capable of
simulating complex urban scenarios by using a library of urban
layouts, buildings, pedestrians, vehicles, and weather conditions
(e.g., sunny, rainy, and foggy). An example scenario is shown in
2 . In this scenario, an Nvidia AI-agent controlled vehicle and
a DriveSim controlled vehicle are placed on highway driving at
different speeds (v) and acceleration (a) separated by a distance
d along with other highway objects (such as road signs, traffic
(a) Vehicle behavior (b) Actuation values
Figure 2: Simulation results of a single run without fault
injection
lights, etc. not shown in the figure). Such parameterization
allows mimicking situations such as - (a) a target vehicle
slowing down, (b) a stationary target vehicle, (c) an accelerating
target vehicle, and many more. The scenario manager toolkit
in DriveSim can be used to select various pre-created urban
scenarios. The monitoring and safety evaluators toolkit is used
to subscribe to DriveSim measurements providing ground truth
values associated with the scenario in realtime and then used
to evaluate safety parameters associated with the AI-driven
vehicle (such as whether the vehicle is at the center of the lane,
whether the vehicle maintains a minimum distance from other
vehicles, and whether the speed of the vehicle is within the
safety limits with respect to other vehicles and traffic rules).
Sample vehicle behavior (speed, lane centering, and vehicle
separation) and actuation output measurements are shown in
Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b respectively.
III. KAYOTEE SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
Kayotee was used to profile the ADS workload running on a
computing platform (consisting of Intel Xeon CPUs and Nvidia
discrete GPUs1) and then inject faults using representative fault
models (by uniform random sampling of fault locations in the
GPU architectural state).
A. Experimental Strategy
We built ‘Kayotee’ to characterize error propagation and
masking (a) in the Nvidia GPUs and CPUs, (b) in the ADS,
1In this work, we did not inject faults into the Drive AGX Pegasus [14]
platform.
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Figure 3: Experimental Strategy
and (c) in vehicle dynamics and traffic. For each of these
characterizations, we built a corresponding injector capable of
injecting faults such that errors manifest in the corresponding
locations. In the case of GPUs, we used the GPU injector to
inject architectural-state faults (see Section III-C), and SLI
(Section III-D) to inject into the inputs and outputs of the ADS
kernels (or modules). Corrupting the final output (actuation
commands) of the ADS sent to the AV helps us measure
resilience associated with vehicle dynamics and traffic. As
shown in Figure 3, low-level circuit-, micro-architectural-,
and RTL-faults manifest as architectural-state faults (injected
through GPU-injector). The architectural-state faults that do
not get masked manifest as errors in the internal state of the
kernels of software stack and any error that does not get masked
in the kernel propagates to the output of the kernel. Finally,
errors that are not masked before the point of sending actuation
commands lead to incorrect actuation commands (actuation
errors) sent to the AV. Thus, our approach aids the measurement
of fault masking and propagation at different levels and its
corresponding impact on the safety of the AV.
B. Kayotee
Kayotee is a fault injection tool that can inject transient
(a) hardware faults, and (b) software state errors. Kayotee
is bundled with a campaign manager that takes an XML
configuration file as input to select a fault model, software
or hardware module sites for fault injection, the number of
faults, and a scenario. The campaign manager uses the specified
configuration to (a) profile the ADS workload, (b) generate a
fault plan, and (c) inject one or more transient faults per run into
the ADS system (until required confidence levels are reached).
To monitor and understand the impact of transient faults on
the safety and reliability of the ADS, it is important to ensure
that the simulation is deterministic. However, a control-loop
based system by definition is non-deterministic in nature. Thus,
we developed an ‘event-driven synchronization’ module that
coordinated between all the toolkits (DriveSim, monitoring,
evaluators, and AI-agent) to ensure that the parameters of the
moving objects (AI-vehicle, other vehicles, etc.) in the scenario
(including the AI-vehicle) roughly follow a truncated normal
distribution.
C. GPU Injector Fault Models
We consider transient faults in the functional units (e.g.,
arithmetic and logic units, and load store units), latches, and
unprotected SRAM structures of the GPU processor. Such
transient faults are modeled by injecting bit-flips (single and
double) in the outputs of the executing instructions. If the
destination register is a general-purpose register or a condition
code, one bit (or two bits) is randomly selected to be flipped.
For store instructions, we flip a randomly selected bit(s) in
the stored value. Since we inject errors directly into live state
(destination registers), our error model does not account for
various masking factors in the lower layers of the hardware
stack such as circuit-, gate-, and micro-architecture-level
masking as well as masking due to errors in architecturally
untouched values. The GPU injection tool uses the same
profiling and fault-injection plan generation mechanism as
used in SASSIFI [15]. We do not consider faults in cache,
memory, and register files because we assume that they are
protected by ECC.
D. SLI Fault Models
The goal of SLI (Source-Level Injection) is to corrupt the
internal state (by corrupting output variables) of the ADS
software components. In Table I, we show some of the variables
from each of the ADS modules (see 3 in Figure 1) that were
targeted using SLI. The fault models supported by SLI are as
follows –
• Random: The chosen variable is randomly modified to a
value within the range of zero to vehicle speed limit on
the road (e.g., 65mph for majority of US urban interstate
roads). For example, in case of object class we use
possible object classes supported in the Nvidia ADS
but for pid measured values we choose a random value
between zero and 65mph (highway speed limit).
• Fixed: The chosen variable is always set to the fixed value.
It helps to evaluate the worst possible fault cases, e.g.,
pid output for the speed controller is always set to the
maximum supported value. This fault-model is useful to
inject known fault conditions, and most importantly when
generating worse-case intermittent or permanent errors to
understand the maximum resiliency offered by the ADS.
• Scale: The chosen variable is scaled to some ratio of the
current value of the variable.
• Disappear: The chosen output is either not delivered to
the next module, if it does not lead to the software crash,
or set to null (or zero) if it does lead to software crash.
E. Error and Safety Metrics
To characterize error and safety in the ADS, we propose
a new ontology model to capture a range of issues that can
occur in the real-world and also observed from fault injection
campaigns. An ontology model capturing the fault manifestation
in the ADS is shown in Fig. 4. Any run with an injected
fault is labeled as activated if any of the monitored values
(such as object classification, bounding box, actuator command
values, vehicle measurements, etc.) do not fall within the
ADS Module Output Variables (fault
injection target)
Fault Model
Path perception lane type, lane-coordinates random, fixed,
Object perception num detected objects,
object class,
object coordinates
scale, disappear
Planning & control pid measured value,
pid target value, pid output
Sensor outputs camera frames Gaussian noise,
occlusion (from
[6])
Table I: SLI supported fault models. Only select few output
variables are shown in the table.
Figure 4: Ontology model for fault manifestation in AVs
expected value range obtained in the golden runs, i.e., a run
with no injection or if leads to a hang or crash. We use an
IQR (interquartile range)-based outlier detection algorithm [16]
combined with the range of the distribution in the golden run
to label a variable as containing an erroneous value. Such
error labeling is scenario-specific as the ground truth values
are obtained by running the ADS for a specific scenario with
no injection; otherwise, it is labeled as masked. An activated
fault can be further classified as DUE (detectable uncorrectable
error, such as a hang or crash) or SDC (silent data corruption).
We label a run as SDC if there is a change in the value of any
of the monitored variables in the AV stack compared to the
golden run value. SDCs can lead to actuation errors, and any
such run is labeled as actuation-error. Actuation errors can
lead to a breach in the safety envelope or traffic violations or
both. A breach in the safety envelope can lead to an accident.
In our study, we defined following scenario-agnostic safety
metrics for breaches of safety:
Safety envelope breach occurs when the collision distance (
i.e., which is the distance traveled by the vehicle from its current
position to collision point) between AV and any other object
on the road (moving or stationary) is less than the stopping
distance (refer to section 2.6.1 of [17]). The collision point
can be calculated using trajectory estimation approaches [18].
The stopping distance (Ds) is given by
Ds = Dp +Dr +Db (1)
Perception distance (Dp) is the distance the vehicle travels
in ideal conditions from the time that the driver (human or
AI-agent) of the vehicle sees a hazard until the brain or ADS
recognizes it. The average perception time for an alert human
driver is 1.75 seconds [17]. For an AI-agent the worst-case
recognition time is 1/FPS, where FPS is the frames per
second processed by the AI-agent.
Recognition distance (Dr) is the distance the vehicle will
continue to travel in ideal conditions before physically hitting
the brakes in response to a hazard seen ahead. The average
human driver has a reaction time of 0.75 to 1.0 seconds [17].
For an AI-agent, this corresponds to the time taken to send an
actuation command after recognizing the hazard.
Braking distance (Db) is the distance the vehicle will travel
in ideal conditions while braking. On a highway at 24.5872
meters/sec (55mph), a vehicle will travel a minimum of 64
meters of braking distance [17]. If two vehicles are on a
highway traveling in the same direction, the vehicle separation
may only be 20 meters, but the collision distance is significantly
higher due to vehicle dynamics. The braking distance depends
on the road surface and the type, weight, speed, and acceleration
of the vehicle. In this paper, we only considered speed to
calculate braking distance. However, the braking distance
can be more accurately calculated using previously proposed
models [19], [20].
Lane centering breach occurs when the distance from the
lane center changes by more than 0.5 meters.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we presented Kayotee, a fault injection tool,
along with methodologies to empirically assess the fault
propagation, resilience, and safety characteristics of the ADS.
The main objective of Kayotee is to evaluate the effects
of the faults on the ADS and to investigate the maximum
number of the faults that the ADS can tolerate before a safety
violation occurs. Although Kayotee may help identify some
of the software design issues or bugs in the ADS, it does not
systematically evaluate the software design or bugs (e.g., using
static checkers).
The future work involves —
• porting Kayotee to the publicly available open-source
Apollo [10] system and to share the resilience/safety
characteristics with the community,
• beam-testing of the CPUs and GPUs to understand
the differences in emulated faults on CPUs/GPUs to
representative faults that may occur in the field.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This material is based upon work supported by an IBM
Faculty Award, and by the National Science Foundation
(NSF) under Grant Nos. ACI 1535070 and CNS 15-45069.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations
expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the NSF. We thank K. Atchley,
Ankit Gupta , Vibhor Rastogi, and Matt Campbell for their
help.
REFERENCES
[1] S. S. Banerjee, S. Jha, J. Cyriac, Z. T. Kalbarczyk, and R. K. Iyer,
“Hands off the wheel in autonomous vehicles?: A systems perspective
on over a million miles of field data,” in 2018 48th Annual IEEE/IFIP
International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN).
IEEE, 2018.
[2] G. Li, S. K. S. Hari, M. Sullivan, T. Tsai, K. Pattabiraman, J. Emer, and
S. W. Keckler, “Understanding Error Propagation in Deep Learning
Neural Network (DNN) Accelerators and Applications,” in Proc.
International Conf. for High Performance Computing, Networking,
Storage and Analysis, 2017, pp. 8:1–8:12.
[3] K. Pei, Y. Cao, J. Yang, and S. Jana, “DeepXplore: Automated whitebox
testing of deep learning systems,” in Proc. of the 26th Symposium on
Operating Systems Principles, 2017, pp. 1–18.
[4] B. Salami, O. Unsal, and A. Cristal, “On the resilience of rtl nn
accelerators: Fault characterization and mitigation,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1806.09679, 2018.
[5] B. Reagen, U. Gupta, L. Pentecost, P. Whatmough, S. K. Lee,
N. Mulholland, D. Brooks, and G.-Y. Wei, “Ares: a framework for
quantifying the resilience of deep neural networks,” in Proceedings of
the 55th Annual Design Automation Conference. ACM, 2018, p. 17.
[6] S. Jha, S. S. Banerjee, J. Cyriac, Z. T. Kalbarczyk, and R. K.
Iyer, “Avfi: Fault injection for autonomous vehicles,” in 2018 48th
Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems
and Networks Workshops (DSN-W). IEEE, 2018.
[7] A. H. M. Rubaiyat, Y. Qin, and H. Alemzadeh, “Experimental
resilience assessment of an open-source driving agent,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1807.06172, 2018.
[8] A. Dosovitskiy, G. Ros, F. Codevilla, A. Lopez, and V. Koltun, “CARLA:
An open urban driving simulator,” in Proc. of the 1st Annual Conf. on
Robot Learning, 2017, pp. 1–16.
[9] CommaAI, “OpenPilot: Open Source Driving Agent,” https://github.com/
commaai/openpilot, Accessed: 2018-09-12.
[10] Baidu, “Apollo Open Platform,” http://apollo.auto, Accessed: 2018-09-02.
[11] F. Codevilla, M. Mu¨ller, A. Lo´pez, V. Koltun, and A. Dosovitskiy,
“End-to-end driving via conditional imitation learning,” in Proc. of
International Conf. on Robotics and Automation (ICRA), 2018.
[12] SAE International, Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to
Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles, Sep 2016.
[13] NVIDIA, “NVIDIA Drive Simulation,” https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/
self-driving-cars/drive-constellation/, Accessed: 2018-09-02.
[14] Nvidia Corporation, “Drive Pegasus,” https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/self-
driving-cars/drive-platform/, Accessed: 2018-09-12.
[15] S. K. S. Hari, T. Tsai, M. Stephenson, S. W. Keckler, and J. Emer,
“Sassifi: An architecture-level fault injection tool for gpu application
resilience evaluation,” in Performance Analysis of Systems and Software
(ISPASS), 2017 IEEE International Symposium on. IEEE, 2017, pp.
249–258.
[16] A. M. Committee et al., “Robust statistics–how not to reject outliers.
part 1. basic concepts,” Analyst, vol. 114, no. 12, pp. 1693–1697, 1989.
[17] California DMV, “Driving Safely,” https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/
dmv/?1dmy&urile=wcm:path:/dmv content en/dmv/pubs/cdl htm/sec2,
Accessed: 2018-08-05.
[18] M. Brown, J. Funke, S. Erlien, and J. C. Gerdes, “Safe driving envelopes
for path tracking in autonomous vehicles,” Control Engineering Practice,
vol. 61, pp. 307–316, 2017.
[19] D. Wu, J. Li, X. Shu, X. Zha, and B. Xu, “Test analysis and theoretical
calculation on braking distance of automobile with abs,” in International
Conference on Computer and Computing Technologies in Agriculture.
Springer, 2010, pp. 521–527.
[20] J. Yi, L. Alvarez, X. Claeys, and R. Horowitz, “Emergency braking
control with an observer-based dynamic tire/road friction model and
wheel angular velocity measurement,” Vehicle system dynamics, vol. 39,
no. 2, pp. 81–97, 2003.
